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v. Illinois: The Defense Gets the
Reverse- Witherspoon Question

.Morgan

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Morgan v. Illinois' the United States Supreme Court settled the "reverse- Witherspoon'2 question. The Court held that a trial court in a capital case must, upon the defendant's request, specifically inquire into a
prospective juror's views on capital punishment and that a potential juror
who would always vote for a sentence of death, regardless of the facts,
must be struck for cause.3 Further, the Court stated that the presence of
even one partial juror on a defendant's panel offends the defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment' right to a fair and impartial jury and the sentence may not stand.'
Before Morgan, trial courts often refused a defendant's request for a
specific inquiry into whether any prospective jurors would always vote for
the death penalty upon conviction of a capital crime. Trial judges maintained that a general question concerning the prospective juror's ability
to follow the law sufficed to identify impartial jurors.' However, the Court
held that such questions are inadequate.7 When a trial court refuses the
defendant's request for the specific question of a potential juror's vote on
death sentences, the sentencing phase must be retried.8
II. THE CASE
According to Illinois state law, capital cases are tried in two phases.'
The jury first decides whether the defendant is guilty of a capital offense.10 Upon a finding of guilt, the same jury determines whether the
1. 112,S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
2.
3.

See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
112 S. Ct. at 2235.

4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
5. 112 S. Ct. at 2234.

6. Id. at 2226.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 2232.
Id. at 2232-33.
ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1990).
Id. para. 9-1(g).
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defendant should be sentenced to death."1 In considering the sentence,
the court instructs the jury that it must find unanimously,1 ' beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant is eighteen years old and that at
least one of ten enumerated aggravating factors exists." If no aggravating
factors are found, the defendant is imprisoned rather than sentenced to
death.14 However, if the jury finds the existence of one or more aggravating factors, the court instructs the jury to consider whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death.1 5 The court instructs the jury that when
determining the defendant's sentence, the jury should consider mitigating
factors, including but not limited to any of the five examples that the
statute enumerates. 16
A jury convicted Derrick Morgan of first degree murder and sentenced
him to death. The State proved at trial that Morgan was a hired assassin.,
Morgan killed a drug dealer in an abandoned apartment during a gang
war for turf."7 Under Illinois law the trial court conducts voir dire.16 The
court required three separate venires before finding a satisfactory jury.1 '
0
The State requested the Witherspoon v. Illinois"
inquiry to determine
whether any potential juror could not impose the death penalty regardless of the facts. The court agreed to the State's request and asked each
venire whether any member had moral or religious principles so strong
that he or she could not impose the death penalty regardless of the
facts. 1 The trial court refused the defendant's request to inquire, "If you
found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the
death penalty no matter what the facts [of the case were]?"" The trial
court stated that its question, "Would you follow my instructions on the
law, even though you may not agree?" reached substantially the same in4
formation. 2" The court did not ask three venirepersons the question.'
The court did ask every impaneled juror if each could be fair and impartial. The fair and impartial line of questions led to the striking of one
11.
12.
13.
para.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. para. 9-1(f).
Id. para. 9-1(b). See, e.g., Id. para. 9-1(b)(5) (murder for hire or by contract); Id.
9-1(b)(10) (premeditated murder by preconsidered plan).
Id. para. 9-1(g).

Id.
Id. para. 9-1(c).
112 S. Ct. at 2226.
See People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1184-85 (Ill. 1984).
112 S. Ct. at 2226.
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
112 S. Ct. at 2226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prospective juror who answered that he would always vote for the death
penalty because of a past experience."5
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Morgan's claim that the trial
court's voir dire must include a question directly inquiring whether a potential juror would always vote for the death penalty.2 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari because of the extreme confusion concerning the
requirement of the "life-qualifying" inquiry. 7
III. THE COURT'S OPINION
Justice White, writing for the Court, first stated that "no state is constitutionally required by the Sixth Amendment' s or otherwise to provide
for jury determination of whether the death penalty shall be imposed on
a capital defendant," 2' but a state that so chooses must provide a jury for
sentencing that meets constitutional standards."0 The Court addressed
four different issues in deciding whether a trial court must, upon request
by a capital defendant, ask potential jurors whether any venireperson
would always vote to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of a
capital offense regardless of the facts."
A. Jury at the Sentencing Phase
The Court first addressed the issue of whether a jury provided to a
capital defendant at the sentencing phase must be impartial.2 Justice
White analyzed this issue under the Turner v. Louisiana" rule that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' 4 requires that any
jury impaneled to try a cause must be impartial." Therefore, although
the Constitution does not require that a state provide a capital defendant
with a separate sentencing trial, if the state provides a jury for the sen25. Id. at 2227 n.2.
26. People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755 (Ill. 1991).
27. Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 295 (1991).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a

.

.

. trial, by an impartial jury..

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

112 S. Ct. at 2228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
379 U.S. 466 (1965).

34.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

35. 379 U.S. at 471.
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8
8
tencing, the Sixth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, 7
requires that the jury be impartial 8s

The Constitutionalityof a Death Only Juror

B.

Next, the Court determined whether the Constitution entitles a capital
defendant to challenge for cause, and have removed on the ground of
bias, a prospective juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty
irrespective of the facts or the trial court's instruction of law.3 9 First, the0
Court defined an impartial,juror. The Court relied on Adams v. Texas,'
Wainwright v. Witt,41 and Ross v. Oklahoma.42 Justice White explained
that the Court in Witt held that a court must determine "whether the
juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ,,i
A juror who would never vote for the death penalty in a capital case is
not an impartial juror. 4 A juror unable to vote for the death penalty cannot follow the laws of the state and must be struck for cause. The Court
discussed and distinguished its opinion in Ross, which dealt with a potential juror who answered that he would always vote for the death penalty.5
In-Ross the trial court refused to strike the juror for cause, and the defendant had to use a peremptory strike to exclude the potential juror."6
The Court in Ross emphasized that "[h]ad [this juror been sitting] on the
jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to death, and had petitioner
properly preserved his right to challenge the trial court's failure to remove [the juror] for cause, the sentence would have to be overturned.""4
Here, the trial court did not ask the defendant's requested question-whether any juror would always vote for the death penalty?' 8 A
juror who would always vote for the death penalty has already formed an
opinion concerning the defendant's sentence, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances are irrelevant. 9 The Court stated that a capital de36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Id. amend. XIV.
38. 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
39. Id.
40. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).

41. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).

42. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

112 S. Ct. at 2229 (quoting 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting 448 U.S. at 45)).
Id.
Id.
487 U.S. at 83-85.
Id. at 85.
112 S. Ct. at 2226.
Id. at 2229.
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fendant may challenge for cause a "death always" juror.50 Further, if even
one such juror sits on the defendant's jury, and the jury votes for the
death penalty, the state may not execute the defendant and must re-try
the sentencing."
C. Requirement of the Direct Inquiry
Illinois did not challenge the Court's determinations of the first two
issues." However, Illinois argued that the trial court may refuse a direct
inquiry into the prospective juror's views and satisfy constitutional standards with a more general question." The Court determined whether, on
the defendant's request, the trial court must directly inquire into the prospective juror's views on the death penalty at voir dire.' The Court
stated the general principle that the trial court has great discretion in its
conduct of voir dire, but the trial court.must allow the defendant the
ability to identify biased jurors." Although the trial court should have
great deference, when the Court must determine whether the voir dire
meets the standards set by the Constitution, the Court will not hesitate
to review.5 6
"The principles first propounded in Witherspoon v. Illinois,'7 the reverse of which are at issue here, demand inquiry into whether the views
of prospective jurors on the death penalty would disqualify them from
sitting."55 The Court in Witherspoon held that a juror who expressed a
hesitancy to vote for the death penalty could not be struck for cause, but
a juror who would never vote for the death penalty may be struck for
cause." In Witt the Court stated that it is the State's burden to demonstrate through questioning that a prospective juror holds an opinion
against the death penalty. 0 The Court in Lockhart v. McCreeo1 held that
the only way the State will be able to satisfy its burden is to inquire
directly into the prospective juror's opinion during voir dire." Therefore,
if the trial court prevents the defendant from using voir dire to "lay bare
50. Id. at 2229-30.
51. Id. at 2230.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.

57.
58.

391 U.S. 510 (1968).
112 S. Ct. at 2230-31.

Id.

Id.
Id.

59. 391 U.S. at 519.
60. 469 U.S. at 423.
61. 476 U.S. 162 (1988).

62. Id. at 170.
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the foundation" 8 of the defendant's challenge for cause against a prospective juror, the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury
would be rendered as "meaningless as the State's right, in the absence of
questioning, to strike those (jurors) who would never do so."'" The Court
held that the trial court must grant the defendant a voir dire that sufficiently probes the views of prospective jurors.0 8
D.

The General Question

Illinois next argued that even if the Constitution grants the defendant
an inquiry into the views of prospective jurors, the trial court judge's
questions to the prospective jurors regarding the general ability of the
jurors to follow the laws of the State satisfied the constitutional standard.66 The Court disagreed, finding general "follow the law"' questions
inadequate to determine whether any prospective jurors might always
vote for the death penalty regardless of the facts." The Court stated that
if it accepted such general questions as adequate for determining the possible biases of prospective jurors, it would render Witherspoon and its
succeeding cases useless. 9
The Court held that such general questions are inadequate devices to
discover those jurors who might have views that would impair their ability to follow the law.7 0 Jurors could truthfully answer that they would

follow the law without knowing that their views prevent them from following the law." A juror who will not consider mitigating and aggravating
factors fails to follow Illinois law. 72 The Court noted that it is reasonable
for a juror to believe that she may be impartial and fair with the view
that anyone convicted of a capital crime should always be sentenced to
death.7 3 Illinois law does not state that everyone convicted of a capital
crime must be sentenced to death.74 The statute provides for death penalty only for those capital defendants who the jury decides deserve a
death sentence after considering aggravating and mitigating factors.' 5 The
Court stated that the defendant must be given the opportunity to deter63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

112 S. Ct. at 2232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2233.
Id.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 2233 n.9.

74. Id. at 2226.
75. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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mine whether any jurors function under the misconception that one may
hold the view that all capital defendants must be sentenced to death and
remain fair and impartial. '
Illinois further argued, as did Justice Scalia in his dissent," that be-

cause Illinois law requires a unanimous vote to sentence a defendant to
death,7 the "reverse- Witherspoon" is "inapposite"7 to Witherspoon."
One juror who would always vote against the death penalty can prevent a
jury from issuing a death sentence, one juror who would always vote for
the death penalty cannot force an entire jury to support unanimously
that decision.$' The Court stated that Ross " clearly answered this argument. The Court in Ross stated that the presence of even one impartial
juror poisons the entire jury. 8 Justice White explained that the Court
investigates the presence of interfering biases in each individual juror
rather than the jury as a whole.
The Court held that the only way to make clear to the prospective jurors that one who holds a "death always" view cannot follow the law is to
question directly the prospective juror concerning her views on the death
penalty. Failure to do so after the defendant has requested the question
taints the entire jury.8' A state may not execute a defendant tried by a
jury that in its composition has even one juror who the trial court, at the
defendant's request, did not ask if she would always vote for the death
penalty for a capital defendant, regardless of the facts.87
E. The Dissent
Finally, the Court addressed Justice Scalia's dissent.88 Justice Scalia argued that jurors who will always vote for the death penalty are not biased
because Illinois law does not "preclude a juror from taking the view that,
for capital murder, a death sentence is always warranted." 8' However, the
Court stated that such a juror automatically finds mitigating factors irrel76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

112 S. Ct. at 2233.
Id. at 2235 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2232 n.8.
Id.
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Id.
487 U.S. 81 (1988).
Id. at 85.
112 S. Ct. at 2232 n.8.
Id. at 2233.
Id. at 2234.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 2235 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
89. Id. at 2222, 2237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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evant and are effectively saying that mitigating evidence is not even
0
worth their consideration.9
The Court first noted that Justice Scalia has a "jaundiced view" ' of
the Court's line of cases from Woodson v. North Carolina" through
Sochor v. Florida" concerning the "nature and role of mitigating evidence in the trial of capital offenses."'" In that line of cases the Court
found that the Constitution does not require consideration of aggravating
and mitigating factors, but if the state chooses to consider the factors, the
consideration must meet Constitutional standards." Even more important to the Court was the fact that Justice Scalia's opinion finds no support in either the statutory or decisional law of Illinois." The relevant
Illinois statute states that "[tihe court shall consider or shall instruct the
jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty." In addition, the Illinois
statute indicates that lesser penalties exist for capital defendants who the
jury deems should not be sentenced to death." The Court stated that any
juror who would always vote for the death penalty upon conviction of the
defendant cannot have based such a decision on all of the evidence." The
Court further supported its holding against Justice Scalia's dissent by
stating that in the situation when a capital defendant elects to be sentenced by a judge instead of a jury, 10 0 a judge who states before the trial
that she deems aggravating and mitigating factors irrelevant must disqualify herself from the case. 1"
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court in Morgan provides the death penalty voir dire with proper
balance and symmetry. Illinois recognized the Court's desire to balance
its decisions regarding criminal procedure by arguing that the "reverse0
Witherspoon" question is "inapposite" to the Witherspoon question.1 2
The State argued that a juror who will always vote for the death penalty

90. Id.

91. Id. at 2233.
92. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
93. 112 S.Ct. 2114 (1992).
94. 112 S. Ct. at 2234.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 2233-34.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(c) (Supp. 1990).
Id. para. 9-1(g).
112 S. Ct. at 2234.
Id. at 1112 n.1.
Id. at 2235.
Id. at 2232 n.8.
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does not impact the jury's decision with the same force that a juror who
will never vote for the death penalty impacts the jury.' 03 Although the
argument failed, it recognizes the current Court's approach to criminal
procedure cases. Future criminal procedure arguments before this Court
should attempt to frame issues as questions of symmetry.
In a line of cases similar to Witherspoon and Morgan the Court provided symmetry in peremptory strikes. In a 1986 case, Batson v. Kentucky,10 4 the Court held that a defendant may challenge the prosecution's
use of peremptory strikes against black venirepersons. In Georgia v. McCotlum'1 the Court held that the prosecution must have the "reverseBatson" challenge when the defense uses peremptory strikes against
black venirepersons.'" The Court provided further balance by extending
the Batson challenges to the civil forum in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.'0 7 The decision in Morgan follows the Court's symmetrical approach to legal procedure.
The Court properly recognized the importance of detailed voir dire in
fulfilling the defendant's right to have a jury free from persons who will
always vote for the death penalty.108 The Court explained that it is likely
that a venireperson might not understand that a person who will always
vote for the death penalty cannot be impartial and fair.' 09 As the Court
noted,"" a prospective juror might not truly understand that her views
prevent her from being impartial and only in depth questioning during
voir dire will expose the venireperson's impartiality."' The Court shows
its sensitivity to the reality of voir dire by stating that a general "follow
the law" question from the judge falls far short of determining the prospective juror's true views." 2 The Court's recognition of the import of
extensive voir dire to effectuate constitutional rights should be used as
authority in situations when prosecutors or defense lawyers ask for more
extensive voir dire.
Finally, the decision in Morgan may open the door for a flood of future
federal habeas reviews. If the Morgan rule is retroactive, many prisoners
on death row whose "Morgan" questions were denied by the trial court
may be able to have their sentences reversed and retried. Whether the
Morgan rule fits within one of the two exceptions in the Teague v.
103. Id.
104. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

105. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
106. Id.
107. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
108. Id. at 2233.

109. Id.
110. Id. at 2233 n.9.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2233.
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Lane'" rule for retroactivity is subject for a more extensive project. The
Morgan rule might be considered a new rule because the result "was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.""' However, the Court confused this exception in Butler v.
McKellar1' making the retroactivity inquiry difficult "where the Court's
decision is reached by an extension of the reasoning of previous cases
...
,p" If Morgan is a new rule that applies retroactively not only will
many death row inmates have federal habeas reviews for cases when the
specific inquiry was denied, but some, because the request is standard,
may have claims for inadequate counsel if the defense attorney failed to
request the question.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court in Morgan provides a proper balance for Witherspoon v.
Illinois.117 Both the defense and the prosecution will now have the ability
to directly inquire into each venireperson's views concerning the death
penalty. Prospective jurors who occupy the most severe ends of the death
penalty spectrum will not be allowed to sit on the jury. The laws concerning the death penalty will hopefully be more accurately effected by striking biased jurors on the farthest ends of the death penalty issue.
THOMAS JOSHUA

R. ARCHER

113. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). (Holding that new rules are generally not retroactive unless the
rule places certain individual conduct beyond the authority of the state to control or the
new rule requires observance of procedure that is "implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty.")
114.

Id. at 301.

115. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
116. John Blume & William Pratt, The Changing Face of Retroactivity, 58 UMKC L.
Rav. 581, 589 (1990).
117. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).

